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Can't We All Just Get Along?: Civil Support and Interagency Cooperation in the 1992 Los Angeles Riots

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:\_\_\_\_\_

10 May 2007

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## **ABSTRACT**

Civil Support – military assistance to US civilian authorities – is a key component of DOD’s participation in Homeland Security. Execution of the CS mission becomes legally and politically sensitive during responses to civil unrest, when military forces may have to be employed in a domestic law enforcement role. Adherence to the principles of legitimacy and restraint, as well as effective coordination and cooperation with civilian agencies at all levels of government, is necessary for successful completion of such a mission. This paper examines the operational issues and considerations involved in the use of military force to assist civil authority in restoring order following large-scale rioting or insurrection, using the 1992 Los Angeles riots as an illustrative case study. It examines legal considerations including the restrictions contained in the Posse Comitatus Act and the unique status of the National Guard in domestic operations as well as rules for the use of force and the relationships between federal, state, and local officials. Finally, the paper recommends areas of consideration for military or civilian officials involved in similar situations of civil disorder.

## **INTRODUCTION**

Civil Support – military support of US civil authorities for domestic emergencies – is a key component of the Department of Defense’s Homeland Security role, and a mission that US forces have conducted frequently.<sup>1</sup> Most often, Civil Support operations have been conducted to assist civil authorities with humanitarian relief in the wake of natural disasters, bringing manpower and expeditionary capabilities to bear. A more controversial facet of Civil Support is the employment of armed forces to restore order in the event of rioting or insurrection at a scale the city or state government cannot control.

Since the time of the Boston Massacre and before, the proper domestic role of military power has been a sensitive subject among the American people. Strong limits on the military’s domestic powers are enshrined in the Constitution, the Posse Comitatus Act, and the American psyche itself. Despite the controversy, however, significant civil disturbances have required military intervention. One such intervention took place in Los Angeles during the spring of 1992, when a Joint Task Force responded to America’s most destructive riots of the 20<sup>th</sup> century.

How do the lessons of Joint Task Force – Los Angeles (JTF-LA) apply to future civil support operations in response to breakdowns of law and order in American cities? JTF-LA and the Los Angeles riots illustrate the importance of the military principles of legitimacy and restraint when conducting domestic operations to restore order following a breakdown in the effectiveness of civil authority.

The lessons learned from this operation are important to force providers, combatant commanders, and decision makers. The potential need for military forces to assist civil authorities in restoring order from chaos still exists. Natural disasters, catastrophic terrorist

attacks, or local sociopolitical conditions have the potential to lead to widespread lawlessness if local authorities are overwhelmed or unable to respond effectively. Any military response under these conditions will be politically sensitive and require all participants to have a thorough understanding of the commander's intent as well as the legal and operational restraints to be observed in the mission's conduct. The state and federal military responses to the 1992 riots illustrate many of the vital considerations involved.

## **CONTEXT AND HISTORY**

By April 1992, Los Angeles was ripe for civil unrest. The most significant event leading up to the riots occurred in March 1991. After being stopped for speeding and driving while intoxicated, motorist Rodney King was severely beaten by four Los Angeles police officers. The attack was videotaped by a witness and widely broadcast, and on 14 March the four police officers involved were indicted for assault with a deadly weapon and assault under color of authority.<sup>2</sup>

With the black community already angry about the Rodney King beating, a second incident just weeks later further increased tensions in the city. A 15-year old black girl, Latasha Harlins, was shot and killed by a Korean shopkeeper, Soon Ja Du, following a dispute over a container of orange juice. Although convicted of manslaughter, Du was sentenced to five years' probation and ordered to pay a \$500 fine. The light sentence exacerbated tensions between blacks and Koreans and convinced many in the African American community that the US legal system was unjust.<sup>3</sup>

Anger about the Rodney King and Latasha Harlins incidents built on existing tensions resulting from economic conditions in South Central Los Angeles and an adversarial relationship between the citizens of South Central and the Los Angeles Police

Department(LAPD).<sup>4</sup> The departure of industry and reductions in federal aid during the Reagan administration contributed to economic depression in the area. In 1990, five out of six black households in South Central Los Angeles made less than \$50,000 per year; and more than half of all residents over age 16 were unemployed.<sup>5</sup> Crime and gang activity rose along with unemployment, and in 1988 LAPD Chief Daryl Gates instituted a program of police street sweeps intended to round up gang members. In one single night police arrested 1,453 black and Latino teenagers. When Operation Hammer was suspended nearly half of all 21 to 24-year old black males in Los Angeles were listed by the LAPD as gang members, leading to charges of police harassment and racism.<sup>6</sup> The aggressive posture and behavior of the LAPD during these sweeps alienated the African American community and created a climate of distrust between the police and the citizenry.

In this climate of hostility and mistrust, the trial of the four police officers involved in the Rodney King incident proceeded. The videotape of the beating had been widely televised, and most in the city, including Mayor Tom Bradley and Chief Gates, expected the officers to be convicted of at least some of the charges they faced. Instead, on 29 April 1992, all four of the officers were acquitted by a jury in the nearby suburb of Simi Valley, California.

### **THE RIOTS AND CITY RESPONSE**

The verdicts were announced at about 1515. Within minutes of the verdicts, angry groups formed at various locations in South Central, including the intersection of Florence and Normandie Avenues. The riot started around 1615, when a group of men stole bottles of malt liquor from a Korean-owned store, hitting the owner's son in the head with a bottle and smashing a door while yelling, "This is for Rodney King."<sup>7</sup> Police responded around 1630

and found a mob at Florence and Normandie assaulting pedestrians, throwing rocks and bottles at passing vehicles, and smashing shop windows. By 1740, 35 LAPD officers had assembled at the intersection, only to be ordered to leave by the supervisor at the scene.<sup>8</sup> Without an effective police response, violence continued at Florence and Normandie and spread throughout South Central. The rioting, the most extensive in U.S. history, continued for six days, killing 54 people, injuring over 2000, and causing approximately \$1 billion in property damage in Los Angeles County.<sup>9</sup>

The LAPD's initial response to the outbreak of violence was complicated by a lack of preparation. Believing that guilty verdicts were inevitable, the city government did not anticipate any disturbances. As the first rocks were being thrown and stores burned down, two-thirds of the LAPD's patrol captains were at a three-day training seminar several hours north of the city. Chief Gates was attending a political fundraiser in Brentwood, and no officers were held over at the normal 1500 patrol shift change. As a result, the LAPD lacked the manpower, senior leadership, and command and control necessary to respond effectively in the early hours of the riot. Not until 1843 did the LAPD even issue a tactical alert for south Los Angeles, allowing supervisors to deploy reinforcements from other parts of the city.<sup>10</sup>

Unprepared for its own response, the city had also failed to arrange for external help. Under the California Office of Emergency Services (OES), agencies can call on the state mutual aid system for assistance if a situation escalates beyond their control or appears likely to do so. In Los Angeles, such requests would have been coordinated through the county sheriff, who would have allocated force from other regional agencies to assist the LAPD. In addition to his belief that no disturbances would occur, however, it was a point of pride with



Gates that the LAPD could handle any situation on its own. Gates and the sheriff, Sherman Block, also had a difficult personal relationship, with Gates having once told Block, “Sherm, I can’t imagine a circumstance in which we would ever have to call on you for anything.”<sup>11</sup>

Chief Gates’ aversion to outside assistance extended to National Guard support as well. As late as midnight on 29 April, Gates doubted there was a need to deploy the National Guard, telling reporters that he “didn’t want to be taking orders from a general.”<sup>12</sup> Nevertheless, at 2100 on 29 April, Governor Pete Wilson, at the request of the mayor, ordered the mobilization of 2000 troops from the California National Guard’s 40<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division.

### **THE MILITARY RESPONSE**

Due to the assumptions that there would be no major disturbances associated with the verdict and that the LAPD would be able to handle any situation that did arise on its own, the National Guard had not staged any personnel or equipment close to Los Angeles or alerted any units of the possibility of a deployment. Guard planners had been told informally by the California OES that “on-the-street” civil disturbance support from the National Guard would not be required.<sup>13</sup> The first National Guard troops arrived in Los Angeles at 1435 on 30 April, and by 2000 there were approximately 1000 National Guardsmen on the streets with another 1000 preparing to deploy. Expecting an immediate military presence and frustrated with perceived delays in arrival of the forces, Los Angeles County officials requested 2000 more troops at 1100 on 30 April and yet another 2000 were requested at 2356 on 30 April.<sup>14</sup>

Although Guard troops were arriving and conducting operations with local police, the perceived slow pace of their buildup and the continuing mayhem in and around the city led Governor Wilson and Mayor Bradley to request federal assistance from President George H.

W. Bush at 0100 on 1 May. President Bush issued a proclamation ordering the rioters to disperse, followed by an executive order directing that, “Units and members of the Armed Forces of the United States and Federal law enforcement officers will be used to suppress the violence described in the proclamation and to restore law and order in and about the City and County of Los Angeles, and other districts of California.”<sup>15</sup> The Federal military response was organized as Joint Task Force – Los Angeles, and Marines based at Camp Pendleton began arriving in the Los Angeles area at 1430 on 1 May, followed at 1630 by the JTF commander. Active Army forces from Fort Ord, California arrived at 1730, and at 1800 the President ordered the California National Guard forces in the city to be federalized.<sup>16</sup>

At its peak, JTF-LA comprised 11,500 Active and Reserve component soldiers and Marines. The Task Force operated in Los Angeles County supporting the LAPD, LA County Sheriff’s Department, and other agencies in restoring order until 9 May, when the National Guard was returned to State control and Active Component forces began returning to their bases.<sup>17</sup>

JTF-LA was organized into Army and Marine components under the overall command of Army Major General Marvin Covault of the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division. The Army forces in the JTF were commanded by California National Guard Major General Daniel Hernandez of the 40<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, while the Marine component was commanded by Brigadier General Marvin Hobgood.<sup>18</sup>

The Army component consisted of the 40<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division (National Guard), the 49<sup>th</sup> Military Police Brigade (National Guard), and a brigade of the 7<sup>th</sup> Infantry Division, with the 40<sup>th</sup> ID providing the bulk of the force. The first units to arrive in the city were mechanized infantry units based close to Los Angeles. The National Guard’s plans for

responding to civil disturbances were centered around the 49<sup>th</sup> MP Brigade, which had specialized training and equipment for riot control, but the brigade was stationed north of the San Francisco area, hundreds of miles away.<sup>19</sup> Since the MP unit was not moved to Los Angeles as a precaution, leaders were forced to draw initially on the units based closest to the scene even though they were not the units best suited to the mission.

The Marine Corps deployed a Special Purpose Marine Air-Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) to the area. The SPMAGTF included a command element, the 3d Battalion of the 1<sup>st</sup> Marines, the 1<sup>st</sup> Light Armored Infantry Battalion, Combat Service Support Detachment 11, a platoon of Military Police, and a transportation detachment.<sup>20</sup>

The command and control relationships between military forces and the city government changed significantly upon the establishment of JTF-LA. While operating under state authority, the National Guard established an operations cell at the County Emergency Operations Center (EOC). This cell did not provide specific mission tasking to subordinate units, but rather directed them to report to specific police agencies at particular locations to support those agencies as needed. Unit commanders were authorized to accept specific tasking from the senior police officer in the jurisdiction to which they were assigned.<sup>21</sup> This relatively informal tasking procedure was very effective during the early stages of the military response, and was possible because the National Guard forces were accustomed to operating in support of civilian police. Higher commanders exercised command by negation, preserving a great degree of flexibility for police commanders in employing National Guard units.

This flexibility was made all the more necessary by the lack of an LAPD plan for employment of military forces in the riots. During the first two days of the riots, National

Guard soldiers executed missions as requested by local authorities, including escorting firefighters into riot areas, providing site security, and patrolling the city to enforce the dusk-to-dawn curfew, as well as performing general law enforcement and providing a visible deterrent to crime.

When the JTF was established and arrived in Los Angeles, the tasking procedures implemented by the National Guard were changed significantly. JTF-LA established liaison teams at each of the four LAPD operations bureaus and at the City EOC. The National Guard operations cell at the County EOC became a JTF liaison headquarters and was tasked with collating LAPD support requests with requests from other county agencies. Support requests were forwarded to the JTF headquarters and reviewed by the commander, the staff judge advocate, and the operations officer; approval or denial of the request was then relayed back down the chain to the units involved.<sup>22</sup> Under the JTF, approval of individual support requests required six to eight hours from the time the request was made by the LAPD until approval or disapproval was received by the supporting battalion.

Tactical procedures directed by the JTF made effective support difficult. Under state authority, the National Guard deployed soldiers to police agencies in squad strength; the JTF required all missions to be conducted at a minimum of platoon strength in order to ensure that an officer would always be present.<sup>23</sup> This measure greatly reduced the number of support missions that could be undertaken and did not fully leverage the leadership capabilities of the noncommissioned officers in the field. The deployment of smaller formations operating in conjunction with the police but in positions allowing for mutual support would have helped to create an appearance of omnipresence, helping to deter lawlessness more rapidly.

## **LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS AND USE OF FORCE**

The employment of federal troops inside the United States is a sensitive subject, never more so than when the use of force against American citizens may be required by their mission. One of the most important considerations in such operations is the legal framework within which the forces must operate. The Posse Comitatus Act is widely understood to state that federal armed forces may not conduct law enforcement activities within the United States. This is generally true, but there are a number of exceptions to the original prohibition that commanders should clearly understand when conducting civil support operations.

The language of the act states that activities expressly authorized by the Constitution or by statute are exempt from the restrictions of the Posse Comitatus Act itself; one of these exceptions is the President's statutory authority to use federal troops to quell domestic violence.<sup>24</sup> Under Title 10 of the United States Code, Sections 331-335, the President may employ armed forces to suppress rebellions or civil disorder upon request of the affected state's governor and after issuing a proclamation ordering "the insurgents to disperse and retire peaceably to their abodes within a limited time," which President Bush did on 1 May 1992.<sup>25</sup>

National Guard troops operating under state authority enjoy full law enforcement powers at the discretion of their governor. Federal troops are bound by Posse Comitatus, and may only conduct law enforcement missions within the confines of that law or one of its various exclusions. This dichotomy can result in two military forces operating in the same area with significantly different operating restrictions. Commanders must fully understand both rule sets in order to decide how best to organize the available forces and under what restrictions they must conduct their missions.

The JTF-LA commander faced this situation. National Guard forces were operating in close cooperation with police and their legal status under state control allowed them to execute all law enforcement support missions the police requested. When federal forces arrived, the JTF commander considered his forces to be restrained by the Posse Comitatus Act and unable to legally participate in law enforcement activities, a restriction he extended to National Guard units after federalization. In fact, federal troops were exempted by statute from Posse Comitatus restrictions under the President's power to quell domestic violence, an exemption that applies to both Active Component and federalized National Guard troops.<sup>26</sup>

The restrictions had a significant impact on mission effectiveness. Prior to federalization, National Guard units responded to every request for assistance. Under the JTF, the response rate decreased to about 20 percent as the JTF commander and staff distinguished between military and law enforcement functions, denying requests for support classified as the latter.<sup>27</sup> In one example, federalized National Guard troops were denied permission to transport prisoners arrested during the riot by the LAPD.<sup>28</sup>

Commanders may at times want to restrict their forces' participation in law enforcement activities. Political sensitivities may dictate a limited military role, or a restricted level of participation may be agreed upon between military and civilian leaders. The presence of military forces on the streets of an American city is a powerful image, and it may be wise to exercise significant control of the forces in order to avoid incidents. In cases like Los Angeles, however, where the use of force becomes essential to accomplishing the mission of restoring order, commanders must have a clear understanding of the legal authority under which they are operating. This authority may, as in Los Angeles, include responsibility for law enforcement activities.<sup>29</sup>

In the event that full law enforcement powers are authorized, commanders may not want to immediately avail themselves of those powers. Public opinion in the United States is fragile, and perceptions of abuses of US citizens by military personnel would be damaging to mission success. The legitimacy of military forces operating within the US can be enhanced by placing such forces in roles that are clearly in support of the requesting local or state government. Doing so keeps a local face on the operation by ensuring that the federal government is clearly acting in support of local interests.

Restraint and legitimacy work to reinforce each other. One key consideration in Civil Support operations is effectively controlling the use of force. Rules for the use of force (RUF) during the Los Angeles riots differed for state and federal forces. Federal forces under JTF-LA adhered to self-defense RUF with some additional powers to detain civilians, while National Guard forces under state control were governed by the standards applicable for California peace officers. Once the National Guard forces were federalized, the JTF rules applied to those troops as well. These rules included the designation of Arming Orders, which prescribed the readiness condition of individual weapons and ranged from AO1 – rifle at sling arms, magazine in pouch, chamber empty – to AO6, in which the rifle was carried, bayonet fixed, with a round chambered.<sup>30</sup> The JTF commander set citywide Arming Orders, which gave him significant control and reduced the risk of incidents, but may have been tactically inappropriate in an operating environment where security conditions varied greatly from block to block.<sup>31</sup>

Ideally, commanders engaged in civil disturbance responses should establish clear rules for the use of force and rely on the discipline and training of their troops and junior leaders. The validity of this approach can be illustrated by a comparison of military use of

force in the 1965 and 1992 Los Angeles riots. Under both state and federal control, National Guard and Active Component troops alike demonstrated significant fire discipline. JTF-LA engaged in three military-involved shooting incidents, expending 20 rounds, killing one suspect and arresting two. By contrast, “during the 1965 Watts riots there was considerable machine gun fire and great expenditure of ammunition from small arms through .50 caliber.”<sup>32</sup> This increased level of discretion can be attributed to the training and education of the volunteer force and demonstrates General Krulak’s “strategic corporal” concept: the soldiers and Marines in JTF-LA were trained and disciplined enough to make sound tactical decisions and exercise restraint in a stressful and sensitive environment.

### **ANALYTICAL CONCLUSIONS**

On 9 May, the California National Guard was returned to state status and Active Component forces began redeploying to their home bases. The last National Guard troops left Los Angeles on 29 May, one month after the riots erupted.<sup>33</sup> The deployment and operations of JTF-LA achieved the desired effect of restoring law and order, but with some difficulties that may have been avoided through better coordination, planning, and understanding of the operating environment. The riots were suppressed and the large military presence led to a large reduction in crime in the affected areas after the riots subsided – police in Compton reported a 70 percent drop in crime.<sup>34</sup>

The exercise of restraint by JTF-LA supported and was essential to mission accomplishment. By providing a highly visible deterrent presence resulting in a precipitous drop in crime, the JTF was seen by most in the community as a legitimate and fair force to restore order. Wrongful or excessive use of force by JTF troops would have undermined the widespread public support enjoyed by the forces. Strict RUF set by the JTF commander



contributed to this success, but the restraint exhibited by state-controlled National Guard soldiers prior to the establishment of the JTF shows that a balance between maintaining control at the upper echelons and giving junior leaders in the field the discretion to act can be achieved.

Another significant question is whether the relationships between JTF-LA and local governments served to reinforce the legitimacy of the Task Force and the civil authorities. The principle of legitimacy is critical to military forces involved in Civil Support operations, and in cases of riots or insurrections the principle extends to the civil authorities as well. The need for a military response demonstrates that civil authorities were unable to control the disorder, a fact that may undermine their public support and legitimacy. The answer to this question is a mixed bag. Due to complex local politics the LAPD was seen by many in the community as being less legitimate than the city and state governments even prior to the riots – a perception that contributed to the riots’ outbreak. Thanks to their evenhanded and fair treatment of the population, the JTF was seen in some ways as a peacekeeping force while the LAPD was considered a belligerent or occupying power by many residents.

The JTF visibly took a supporting role to the local government, acting only in response to requests from state and local authorities. This reinforced the perception that the city and state government were still in power, effectively responding to the crisis, and had not ceded the city to federal authorities.

## **RECOMMENDATIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED**

Several recommendations and lessons learned can be drawn from the operations of JTF-LA. One obstacle encountered in 1992 was in the timely establishment of effective command relationships between local government and federal forces. National Guard forces,

benefiting from their experience working with law enforcement agencies, were able to quickly establish a liaison cell at the County EOC. Guard forces were assigned to specific police stations with the task of supporting law enforcement as needed. This mirrors the military supported/supporting relationship with the police in the role of supported organization. Use of this model maximizes military forces' ability to leverage the local knowledge and expertise of the police and adheres to the principle of unity by aligning military unit operating areas with police divisional boundaries, clearly designating the senior police officer present as the man in charge. It also enables military forces to be brought into action quickly by assigning them to prioritized jurisdictions as units flow into the affected area.

Plans for military riot control operations in major cities should be created and reviewed regularly. These contingency plans should include a designation of primary and alternate response units. Critical equipment such as ammunition, riot gear, and nonlethal weapons should be identified and plans to move and distribute this equipment should be made and rehearsed. This would help to avoid situations like that in Los Angeles, where military support was delayed because of problems encountered in transporting ammunition and equipment to deploying National Guard units.<sup>35</sup>

Large scale rioting like that seen in Los Angeles cannot always be predicted, but early identification of potential for instability allows governments at all levels to prepare a response. Ideally, local and state governments should make realistic assessments of the potential for unrest and coordinate support early. Riots may be sparked by either manmade events as in Los Angeles or natural disasters such as Hurricane Katrina. Advance

preparation is often conducted effectively for high-profile public events like the Olympics or the party nominating conventions.

In Los Angeles, city officials did not request assistance out of a reluctance to admit they might not be able to handle a situation alone as well as out of a desire to avoid provoking a violent reaction, factors that might be seen in many cities. A study conducted after the riots by former FBI and CIA Director William H. Webster found that inadequate crisis planning and a failure to respond aggressively were among the factors responsible for the extent of the rioting.<sup>36</sup> A possible remedy would be to create a transgovernmental working group to identify situations that may require state and federal support. Also, proactive deployments of forces in response to potential trouble spots should be conducted as discreetly as possible to avoid inadvertently sparking the disorder one is hoping to avoid.

Wherever possible, city and state governments should manage their own response to civil unrest. Federal forces should generally be employed only upon the request of a state governor and in support of the local authorities. In an age of possible catastrophic terrorist attacks, however, this may not always be possible. The federal government should be prepared to assume control of an incident in the event that state or local governments are rendered unable to request help or otherwise effectively lead the response.

Finally, commanders should ensure that they and their staffs have a full appreciation for the legal environment in which they are operating. When operating within an exemption to Posse Comitatus, federal forces may have full law enforcement authority within the United States. While it may be desirable to place further restrictions on forces due to political or tactical considerations, commanders should be aware that full police powers are available in certain cases, increasing the forces' flexibility. Another facet of the legal environment is the

unique status of National Guard forces under state command. While the principle of unity argues for federalizing such forces and placing them under the same overall command as responding federal forces, consideration should be given to keeping such forces under state command in a parallel organization with extensive coordination and liaison. Such a support situation would be similar to coalition operations overseas, in which coalition partners often have rules of engagement and capabilities that differ from, and may enhance, those of US federal forces.

## **CONCLUSION**

The thought of soldiers patrolling the streets of our cities is a sobering one for most Americans. Nevertheless, the armed forces must be prepared to support civilian authorities in restoring order in the wake of chaos that could erupt due to any number of causes. Any such mission must be undertaken with the greatest of caution and with the goal of restoring the rule of law and ensuring that all of our citizens' constitutional rights are preserved. Doing so will require preparation, flexibility, and steadfast adherence to the principles of restraint and legitimacy. These goals can best be achieved through comprehensive interagency cooperation at all levels of government. Having effective civil-military relationships and operating procedures in place before the next crisis begins will help to ensure a more cohesive response and may help to avoid outbreaks of violence in the future.

## NOTES

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3. Ibid.
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22. Ibid.
23. Schnaubelt.
24. Thomas R. Lujan "Legal aspects of domestic employment of the Army." *Parameters* 27, no. 3 (1 October 1997), 82-97. <http://www.proquest.com/> (accessed May 1, 2007). 10 USC 332 states: "Whenever the President considers the unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the United States, makes it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United States in any state or territory by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he may call into federal service such of the militia of any state, and use such of the armed forces to suppress the rebellion."
25. 10 USC 334.
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33. Ibid.
34. Ibid.
35. Schnaubelt. In 1992, California National Guard ammunition was consolidated at a storage facility in central California. The Guard's plan for emergency distribution called for a helicopter to deliver ammunition to the

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appropriate armories, but no specific aviation unit had been tasked with the mission. When the Guard was ordered to deploy to Los Angeles, a helicopter crew had to be located in their homes at 0120; the helicopter arrived at the storage facility at 0620 and did not depart until loading was completed at 0945. It was then directed to a second facility to pick up additional gear and did not arrive at the division headquarters in Los Alamitos, CA until 1350. This series of delays surely could have been minimized or reduced had a thorough plan been generated and rehearsed.

36. Seth Mydans, "Failures of City Blamed for Riot in Los Angeles." *New York Times*, 22 October 1992. [www.nytimes.com](http://www.nytimes.com) (accessed 1 May 2007).

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